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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Henry

Sanchez

appeals

from

his

conviction

for

possession

cf

methamphetamine.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Sanchez with possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. (R., pp. 3637.)

Sanchez filed a motion to suppress, claiming that his initial detention by

officers and the subsequent search of his person were illegal. (R., pp. 60-61, 8588.) The district court denied the motion after a hearing, concluding that officers
had reasonable suspicion to stop Sanchez and that the search of Sanchez was
justified by a condition of probation. (R., pp. 135-40.) Sanchez pied guilty to a
reduced charge of possession of methamphetamine and the other charge was
dismissed, and he preserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion. (R., pp. 197-99; 9/13/10 Tr., p. 30, L. 4 - p. 31, L. 13; p. 46, Ls. 13-19.)
The court imposed a sentence of seven years with two years determinate. (R.,
pp. 212-13.) Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 240-42.)

1

'

as:

Sanchez states the issues on

A

Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion
to Suppress Evidence?

B.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
sentence of seven years with 2 years fixed, 5 years
indeterminate upon Mr. Sanchez following his plea of guilty?

C.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Sanchez's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence?

(Appellant's brief, p. 2 (capitalization original).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Sanchez failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him?

2.

Has Sanchez failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

2

ARGUMENT

I.
Sanchez Has Faiied To Show Error !n The District Court's Conclusion That
Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Hirn
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop

Sanchez after they saw him behaving suspiciously near a car in a parking lot and
he fled from the officers when they approached.

(R., p. 139.)

On appeal

Sanchez argues that officers' testimony that they believed Sanchez might be
"messing with" or burglarizing a car was "conclusory" and should be disregarded
because the officers did not more fully describe his activities or provide
"independent factors" showing reasonable suspicion and, after disregarding what
officers saw initially, fleeing alone was not sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5.) Sanchez's argument that the trial court

should have disregarded part of the officers' testimony because it did not
independently establish reasonable suspicion is without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

VVilloughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84,
90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004).

"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the
3

draw

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Stewart,
_

P.3d _ , 2012 WL 604165 at *1 (Idaho App., February

State v. Valdez-Molina, 1

2) (citing

Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); ==-.:...:

Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999)).

C.

Sanchez's Argument That The District Court Should Have Rejected Some
Of The Testimony Of The Police Officers Because It Was "Conclusory" Or
Lacking In "Independent Factors" Is Without Merit

It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains
a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a
crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U

1, 30-31 (1968); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,

811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983)). The test for determining whether a seizure has occurred is whether,
under all of the circumstances, the officer's words and actions would have
conveyed to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her to
restrict his or her movement California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991);
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009). A person's
flight from the police may itself be considered suspicious.

Illinois v. Wardlow,

528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000).
In this case officers saw Sanchez and another individual near a car in a
shadowed part of a parking lot after dark. (6/28/10 Tr., p. 8,
18, L. 17 - p. 19, L. 19; p. 9,

6 - p. 9, L. 4; p.

6-16.) The two men appeared to

hide behind the car. (6/28/10 Tr., p. 18, L. 23 - p. 19,
4

trying to

1.) Sergeant Baker

tr.ey

0
the car.

burglarizing or otherwise "doing something"

, p. 9, Ls. 2-5.) Officer Rushing thought
H.

C3C.

might be

, p. 5, Ls. 13-19. 1) When police approached the

men

(6/28/10 Tr., p. 9, L. 5; P.H. Tr, p. 6, Ls. 14-21.) Officer Rushing appmaching
the car iear:ied it was occupied, and the occupant asserted that the two men had
been ·"harassing" him. (6/28/10 Tr., p.19, L. 21 - p. 20, L. 15; P.H. Tr., p. 6, L. 14
- p. 7, L. 15; see also P.H. Tr., p. 8, L. 13 - p. 9, L. 5.) Police detained Sanchez,
one of the two men earlier seen, and learned that he was on probation for a
conviction. (Exhibit A; 6/28/10 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 6-25; p. 12, L. 23 - p. 15, L. 3; p. 20,
L. 16 - p. 21, L. 15.) Suspecting a drug deal and that Sanchez had violated his
probation by drinking alcohol, officers conducted a probation search of Sanchez
and discovered three bags of marijuana and four bindles of methamphetamine.
(6/28/10 Tr., p. 17, L. 11 - p. 18, L. 10; p. 21, L. 16-p. 22, L. 17; P.H Tr., p. 9,
L. 17 - p. 13, L. 5.) A more detailed search at the jail uncovered more evidence
of drug dealing. (P.H. Tr., p. 15, L. 24 - p. 17, L. 1.)
The circumstances established by the officers' testimony support the
district court's finding of reasonable suspicion for the detention. (R., pp. 135-39.)
Seeing two men crouching behind a car in a shadowed part of a parking lot after
dark, who then flee when approached, provided reasonable suspicion of
involvement in present or future criminal activity.

1

The preliminary hearing transcript (designated herein as "P.H. Tr.") is included
in the appellate record as an exhibit. It was considered by the trial court in
relation to the motion to suppress. (6/28/10 Tr., p. 4, L. 19 - p. 7, L. 3; p. 24, L.
23 - p. 25, L. 1; R., pp. 135-37.)

5

Sanchez argues the district court erred because the officers' testimony
was "conclusory" and therefore his activities other than fleeing must be
disregarded,

and

fleeing

alone

did

not

provide

reasonable

suspicion.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 2-6.) This argument ignores the applicable legal standard,
however. Whether the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain
him is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Van
Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Gallegos,
120 Idaho 894, 897, 821 P.2d 949, 952 (1991) ("[T]he proper inquiry is to look at
the totality of the circumstances and ask whether the facts available to the
officers at the time of the stop gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, not probable
cause to believe, that criminal activity may be afoot.").

Even assuming that

seeing the two men ducking down behind a car in a shadowed part of a parking
lot after dark did not itself provide reasonable suspicion of a car burglary or other
crime, certainly that in combination with the men's flight upon being approached
did.

Sanchez's argument that the officers' initial observations did not provide

reasonable suspicion of a criminal activity and the flight considered separately
did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is directly contrary to
established law that the totality of the circumstances known to the officers must
be reviewed.
Because Sanchez's argument is contrary to applicable law, and because
the totality of the circumstances show officers had reasonable suspicion to detain
Sanchez, Sanchez has failed to show error by the district court.

6

IL

Sanchez Has Fai!ed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

!ntroductio;1
The court sentenced Sanchez to seven years with two years determinate

upon his conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

(R., pp. 212-13.)

Sanchez moved for a reduction of his sentence based on a claim that he could
not get into therapeutic community.

(R., pp. 218-23. 2 )

On appeal Sanchez

asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion. (Appellant's brief, pp.
6-10.)

Review of the record shows Sanchez has failed to demonstrate any

abuse of sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

Id.

If a sentence is within applicable

statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for
leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

2

Sanchez has not included any ruiing by the district court on his Rule 35 motion
in the appellate record. (See R., pp. 236-38 (granting thirty days to submit
additional information in support of Rule 35 motion).)
7

C.

Sanchez Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

lg_,_ at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him
on parole is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the
determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144
Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). If the sentence was reasonable when
imposed, to show an abuse of discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion, Sanchez
must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35
motion." Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840.
The district court imposed a sentence of seven years with two fixed on
Sanchez's conviction for possession of methamphetamine. (11/1/10 Tr., p. 61,
Ls. 5-7.) It specifically considered the goals of sentencing. (11/1/10 Tr., p. 57, L.
23 - p. 58, L. 6.) The court noted three prior felony drug-related convictions, and
that substance abuse counseling was provided at all three of those times.
(11/1/10 Tr., p. 58, Ls. 12-18.)

8

Sa~ichez argues his sentence was excessive because of "mitigating
ckcu~1star.ces" i:1cluding that he was a "very young rnan," this is h:s "first feiony
dui," and ne expressed remorse.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.)

The record,

however, shows that Sanchez was 59 years old (PSI, p. 1), was in fact convicted
in this case of possession of methamphetamine and not DUI (R., p. 212), has
three prior drug-related felony convictions and several misdemeanor convictions
(PSI, pp. 3-4), and the sentencing court specifically found that Sanchez was "not
wi!Hng to accept ... responsibility for this crime" (11/1/10 Tr., p. 60, Ls. 16-23; see
PSI, p. 2 (denying any knowledge of controlled substances)).

The "facts"

Sanchez claims as mitigating circumstances are simply untrue.
The "fact" underlying his Rule 35 motion fares little better. In his motion
Sanchez asserted that because he has been rated for community custody he did
not qualify for the therapeutic community. (R., pp. 218-23.) He does not explain
how reducing his sentence would necessarily make him eligible for the
therapeutic community or even why participation in the therapeutic community is
so important that his eligibility for it trumps everything else. (Appellant's brief, pp.
9-10.) Sanchez has failed to show any abuse of discretion.

9

The state res~,ectfujy reouests this Court to affirr.1 the iudc.:ment of the
'

"-

l

.,

..,.,.

district court.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 20:2.
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney Gen~eral
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